The 2017 Qatar Diplomatic Crisis: An Overview of the GCC’s Worst Spat yet


Ilustrasi krisis diplomatik Qatar. Foto: FPCI UI.

There is a popular saying in Arabic that “the neighbor comes before the home”. In other words, in choosing a house to settle in, it is wise to choose the neighbor before the home, because some neighbors can be a hassle to deal with. Doing so would save us from scores of problems that may erupt in the future; thereby disturbing the very comfort, safety, and security that a home should guarantee. Unfortunately, such is not a choice that can be made with relative ease for Qatar, a small country flanked by intimidating strong-armed, bigger neighbors seeking to bring tiny Qatar under their influence. The ongoing diplomatic crisis and blockade against Qatar highlights the awkward position that it occupies in the Gulf region as the odd one out of the neighborhood dominated by contrasting viewpoints, thus making the crisis an interesting case to dissect and analyze. To that end, this paper seeks to address, in brief, the main questions of: (a) how the Qatar diplomatic crisis emerged; (b) enabling factors of the crisis; (c) ramifications of the crisis upon multitude front; (d) challenges in resolving the crisis and efforts done thus far; and (e) whether Indonesia is well- positioned as a third-party facilitator to mediate the crisis. 


The Qatar diplomatic crisis that culminated on June 5, 2017 has to date been underway for more than 1,000 days. Citing, among others, Qatar’s close relations with Iran and its alleged support for terrorism—which Qatar has vehemently denied—the so-called Anti-Terror Quartet (henceforth “the Quartet”) consisting of Qatar’s detractors-cum- neighbors, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt, severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, imposed a comprehensive air and naval blockade on the country, ordered Qataris within their borders to leave, and gave their own citizens two weeks to leave Qatar. The crisis was initially set in motion by the hack of Qatar News Agency on May 23, 2017, in which a “fake news” story falsely attributing inflammatory remarks to the Qatari emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, were posted and subsequently located by the media in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Soon after, Qatar became the target of media onslaught. It was later revealed in July 2017 by the Washington Post that the hacking was orchestrated by the UAE alongside Russia-based hackers, which was denied by UAE. 

Nearly three weeks after the blockade was imposed, the Quartet issued a list of sweeping demands to Qatar that the latter had to comply within ten days. These demands consist of thirteen frameworks that Qatar deems “unattainable” as they can render Qatar a vassal state, including: (a) curbing diplomatic ties with Iran and cease its diplomatic missions in the country; (b) sever all ties to “terrorist organizations” and formally declare them as terrorist groups; (c) close al-Jazeera and its affiliate stations; (d) shut down Qatari-funded news outlets, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al Araby Al-Jadeed, and Middle East Eye; (e) terminate Turkish military presence in Qatar; (f) stop flows of funding for entities that have been designated as terrorists by the Quartet, the United States, and other countries; (g) hand over “terrorist figures” and wanted individuals from the Quartet countries to their countries of origin; (h) cease contacts with the political opposition in the Quartet countries; (i) pay reparations for losses incurred owing to Qatar’s policies in the recent years; and (j) align itself militarily, politically, socially, and economically with the other Gulf and Arab Countries as enshrined in the 2014 Riyadh Agreement. On grounds of national sovereignty, Qatar dismissed and rejected these demands, which later on were phased down by the Quartet to a framework of six broad principles, briefly listed as follows: (1) commitment to combat extremism and terrorism; (2) prohibiting all acts of incitement and expressions that could spread hatred and violence; (3) full commitment to the Riyadh Agreement and its executive mechanism for 2014; (4) commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-US Summit held in Riyadh in May 2017; (5) to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of states and from supporting illegal entities; (6) the responsibility of all States to regard extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. Again, these demands were dismissed by Doha, who deemed the list of demands as unrealistic, saying it is “neither reasonable nor actionable.”1 Eventually, the demands went unfulfilled without any sanctions, despite the 48-hour extension granted by the Quartet. 

The fray was further complicated by U.S. President Donald Trump’s unbidden expression of full support for the move against Qatar through his Twitter account on June 6, 2017. He also denounced Qatar’s leaders as “high-level funders of terrorism”. Trump’s remarks were nothing short of shocking for the Qataris, who regarded themselves as an ally of the United States and itself a host to the latter’s largest military base in the Middle East, the al-Udeid Air Base. It transpired later on, as delivered by the state department, that the U.S. official reaction to the crisis was neutral with the U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, stressing the importance of unity among GCC members. Furthermore, the Pentagon asserted that Qatar is one of the U.S.’ closest allies in the fight against terrorism. A day later, Trump retracted his support for the blockade by calling for a dialogue and end to the crisis, echoing Tillerson’s statement on GCC unity.2 Not only that, Trump also expressed his gratitude to Qatar’s Emir Tamim for his support towards America’s struggle against terrorism and subsequently conceded to a fighter jet deal worth USD 12 billion.

Enabling Factors of the Crisis 

There are several factors enabling the crisis. Firstly, the diplomatic crisis so far has kept a front of campaigning against Qatar’s funding and support of politically active, even sometimes violent, Islamist groups that the Quartet and its allies designate as terrorist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS) and Iran- supported groups.4 Indeed, Qatar has backed Islamist movements following the Arab Spring in 2011.5 Its permissive attitude to financing extremist organizations has been criticized by the U.S. and other Western countries.6 Qatar has acknowledged its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, however it denies aiding militant groups affiliated with al-Qaeda or the IS.7 Qatar argues that its support of Islamists does not entail that it prefers to do so, but rather because such groups “enjoy significant public support.”

Secondly, Qatar’s lenient stance towards the regional rival Iran provoked the ire of other GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE. Qatar has expressed its eagerness in improving relations in all fields with Iran.9 Furthermore, it has never followed Saudi’s footstep in demonizing Iran, although this does not entail that Qatar and Iran share the same political or ideological vision.10 The bilateral relations between the two largely revolves around economic and diplomatic agreements pertaining to the extraction of gas from the North Field, also known as North Dome in Qatar and South Pars in Iran.11 Approximately 40% of Qatar’s gas field is located under Iran’s maritime waters.12 Less than thirty years later, Qatar has become the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) with almost 30% of the world market share.13 The exploration and extraction of gas from the North Dome is therefore essential for the survival of Qatar. Thus, Iran’s role in ensuring the security of extraction along its maritime border with Qatar is crucial. Not to mention, Iran’s hydrocarbon infrastructure along the South Pars has been seen as a business opportunity for Qatari companies to invest.14 Looking at these opportunities, it might seem that Qatar is turning to the Iranian side and allying itself with Iran. However, Qatar is careful in upgrading its relations with Iran in the political front. As will be touched upon in this paper, the blockade against Qatar has actually pushed Qatar closer with Iran. 

Upon further inspection, however, the crisis highlights a longstanding, unresolved problem festering in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Saudi Arabia is the de facto leader. The GCC was established in 1981, at the height of the Iraq-Iran war, allegedly as a bulwark against Iran’s (and Iraq’s) burgeoning influence in the region. The 2017 diplomatic crisis, albeit being the most serious so far, was not the first one to brew among the Gulf countries. A crisis of similar nature erupted in 2014 when the anti-Qatar Quartet withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar over the latter’s alleged interference in their domestic affairs and its support for Islamist groups.1516 The crisis was resolved within eight months with the Riyadh Agreement, whereby several concessions were made by Qatar that includes: (a) the expulsion of Emirati dissidents who, in 2012, fled from the security crackdown on Islamists in the UAE; and (b) the relocation of seven senior members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood who had likewise fled to Qatar.17 Yet, despite the surface-level restoration of relations, the underlying tension between Qatar and its three gulf neighbors still simmers, as evidenced by the emergence of the 2017 crisis.18 This is largely due to Qatar’s independent foreign policy that stood in stark contrast to the values espoused by its neighboring countries, rendering Qatar a threat to Sunni solidarity in the region, especially due to its amicable relations with the regional rival Shia-majority Iran.19 Qatar’s state-funded Al-Jazeera Media Network typifies such individualistic orientation. The news agency has played a great role in providing platform to political oppositions such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a bold move that sought to challenge the status quo in a region so averse to change. Other GCC countries deemed Qatar’s support for anti-status quo movements as a threat to regional stability that they perceive can only be maintained through the preservation of the status quo that they sought to create as a group. By contrast, Qatar was a vocal promoter of regime change across the Arab World.20 This promotion of regime change was facilitated largely by Al Jazeera that is known to be highly critical of other regimes in the region.21 Its role in emboldening and supporting uprisings during the 2011 Arab Spring is a case in point. For that reason, the Quartet tenaciously demanded the closure of Al Jazeera, a demand unheeded by Doha to this day.

As mentioned above, Qatar’s maverick political stance is indubitably a source of annoyance for the Quartet, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and is a major cause for turmoil in the region. However, President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017—his first foreign trip as a president—may have played a vital role in catalyzing this crisis. There, Trump expressed his unwavering commitment to Riyadh and its allies to contain Iran and thwart radical Islam in the region. According to former White House strategist Steve Bannon, Saudi Arabia and its allies had grown to be more aggressive in combatting terrorism in the months following the visit.22 Furthermore, he asserted, it could not be a coincidence that the blockade against Qatar was imposed only two weeks after the summit.23 The historic visit to Riyadh marked the success of Saudi and Emirati efforts to influence the White House to harshen its stance against Doha and it was construed as a “green light” for the Quartet’s austere approach towards Qatar.24 Together with the abovementioned enabling factors of the conflict, these factors may have bolstered the pretext for the Quartet’s unforgiving blockade against Qatar and given way to the lingering feud as we know it. 


The diplomatic crisis involves many actors with major interests at stake. It affects GCC states’ foreign affairs with non-GCC countries as well. Likewise, other sectors are also heavily impacted by the blockade. This paper limits the analysis of implications into three categories: (1) on political-security front; (2) on economic front; (3) on social and humanitarian front.

First, on political-security front, the diplomatic crisis has paralyzed the GCC and made the defects of the organization more pronounced. Not only has this diplomatic crisis undermined the very values, upon which the GCC was formed, it has also heightened cynicism and scepticism within the region. Saudi Arabia-UAE bilateral military and economic alliance that was formed in late December 2017 further bolstered such scepticism. Furthermore, it bore unintended consequences whereby Iran-Qatar and Qatar-Turkey relations were strengthened as Qatar pursued new alignments in the absence of regional support. The two rushed to Qatar’s assistance as soon as the blockade was imposed, offered the establishment of new trade links, and delivered various consumer goods via ships and planes.26 Iran delivered 350 tons of food to Qatar as soon as the blockade was imposed, while Turkey posted 3.000 troops in Qatar. 27 The strengthening relations between Turkey and Qatar was further highlighted by Qatar’s support of Turkey’s invasion of Syria although other Arab countries condemned it.28 Meanwhile, Turkey, while siding with Qatar, is reluctant to sever ties with Saudi Arabia and UAE because of its common interests with the two in regional battlefields.29 From that, it is clear that this blockade has only helped to serve Turkish and Iranian interests, rather than punishing them—Iran, in particular. Another political consequence is evident in Qatar’s closer relations with Russia. The two has expressed mutual intention to strengthen relations in multiple fields and to enhance joint cooperation, particularly in economic and trade fields, with Russia expressing its willingness to support the upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar by underlining its own experience in organizing large-scale events.30 Although Russia is unable to officially take sides in the issue for fear of endangering its energy interests, Russia has, indirectly, supported Qatar by, among others, engaging in active dialogue with the latter more than with other GCC countries.31 The deepening relations between Russia and Qatar transpired despite the two countries’ different stances in the Syrian War, with Qatar playing the role of supporter to the opposition of Assad’s regime and Russia in support of it. A year had elapsed since the blockade was imposed and already Oman, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey saw a massive increase in trade with Qatar that gave them economic boost; on the other hand, the blockade became a stress test to Qatar’s economy, Emirati ports lost the neighboring market, Saudi’s dominance was challenged by Iran’s growing presence, and the GCC as an organization faced internal divisions that caused it to lose reputation and cohesion. It can therefore be said that we are witnessing a new gulf political landscape in which Oman, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey are winners of this blockade; while Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the GCC loses. 32 

While ramifications of the crisis on political front is significant, it is perhaps on the economic front that the impact of the blockade is most palpable and far-reaching. For one thing, the Quartet’s air and naval blockade against Qatar has placed Qatar Airways—Doha’s flag carrier—in a difficult position as it suffered substantial loss of hundred millions of dollars annually as many routes were blocked amid the lingering dispute although the airline has cushioned the impact by launching flights to new destinations, increasing existing routes, and leasing aircraft to other airlines.33 Furthermore, Qatar was reliant on food exports from Saudi Arabia, whom Qatar shares its only land border with, to feed its population of 2.7 million. Yet, with the blockade in place, food exports were hindered. Nevertheless, Qatar ultimately figured out a way to subsist without the help of its neighbors and cushion the impact of the embargo by, among others, seeking new alignments or importing goods or foodstuffs from third parties/countries, as well as harnessing tourism, investment, and its sovereign wealth fund.34 In response to the blockade, Qatari government intensified its efforts to attract foreign investment and prevent the businesses already in Qatar from leaving.35 From economic standpoint, Qatar has been quite resilient in dealing with the economic fallouts of the blockade by diversifying its economy to mitigate the impact of the dispute. 

Unlike ramifications on political-security or economic front, the social and humanitarian front is less emphasized. However, it is perhaps justified to say that the gravest implications are felt on this particular front. Human Rights Watch revealed in 2017 that the forced isolation imposed on Qatar has caused the separation of families, interruption of medical care and education, as well as leaving migrant workers stranded without food or water.36 Moreover, the crisis has threatened the region’s khaleeji identity, also referred to as Gulf identity or identity of the Eastern Arabia that is grounded on cultural, social, historical, and political homogeneity of the Gulf countries (namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). 37 This identity is an encapsulation of the common characteristics shared by the Gulf countries, thus setting the khaleejis/inhabitants of the Gulf apart from other Arabs. The strong social bonds among the khaleejis in the Gulf is apparent as many extended families are interspersed across countries and cross-national intermarriages are prevalent. Not only that, the Quartet also miscalculated Qatari population’s response to the blockade. Instead of putting the ruling family in a negative light to turn the public against them, the blockade has heightened Qataris’ sense of nationalism and pride and gave rise to an “us against the world” sentiment among the population owing to Qatar’s success in weathering the economic and diplomatic fallouts of the crisis.38 On top of that, it has made Qataris more supportive of free speech.39 From this, it can be concluded that although the crisis has incurred tremendous harms and losses on many fronts, the humanitarian costs of the blockade are most immediate, significant, and should be regarded as such. 

Challenges and Efforts 

It is thought that this diplomatic crisis will only end with a dialogue. However, international actors are reluctant to play an active role to mediate and only few have actually facilitated it.40 Efforts to mediate the crisis is further undermined as there exists a narrative among the blockading states—particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE—that the mediator has to either be “with us” or “against us”. To date, mediation efforts by Kuwait and the U.S. have only plateaued in an impasse, while Oman is not an ideal mediator due to its “issues” with Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Quartet rejected all attempts of mediation by Turkey.41 Besides, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have unflaggingly rejected mediation attempts, a stance made clear by Anwar Garfash, the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, who posted on his Twitter account the following: “I sincerely advise Qatar that there will not be any mediation from outside the gulf,” and that “no pressure will work, media campaigns will not alter your fate, your crisis is ongoing. Be wise and negotiate with your neighbors who have real concerns to solve the outstanding differences.”42 

To counter the fallout from the crisis, Qatar has employed public diplomacy tools and ramped up its soft power approach. The various public diplomacy tools employed by Qatar to counter securitization efforts by the Quartet include, among others, political engagement, digital diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, sport and science diplomacy, economic diplomacy, citizen’s diplomacy and others. 43 These public diplomacy measures have primarily two purposes: first, to counteract the negative and demeaning narratives made by the blockading countries to portray Qatar as a threat to regional stability and peace in the region; and, second, to project a favorable image of Qatar as an open, tolerant, and progressive society.44 Albeit having to cope with substantial losses in many sectors due to the crisis, these public diplomacy and soft power measures, combined with Qatar’s enormous wealth and flexibility in pursuing new alignments have made the country resilient in coping with the lingering blockade. Should this positive progression continue and the country maintains its shrewd strategies to counteract the blockade, Qatar might even emerge stronger than it ever was before as it adapts to the new status quo. 

Indonesia’s position 

Having good relations with all GCC countries, Indonesia remains neutral. This neutrality was affirmed in the early days of the diplomatic row when Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry urged the Gulf countries to pursue dialogue to resolve the diplomatic crisis.45 The fact that Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim state by population makes it an important cultural and political ally for the Arab world.46 In addition, Indonesia’s recognition in the Middle East for having the world’s largest Muslim population was capitalized on under President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy that sought to improve relations with countries in the Middle East.47 Unlike Kuwait and Oman (or even the U.S.) with clear security interests, Indonesia’s interest in the region is limited to economic-related concerns that may arise from the crisis, such as on the matters of hajj pilgrimage, tourism, investment, and foreign workers. Although the blockade against Qatar has only moderate impact on Indonesia, should the tensions continue to escalate, Indonesia’s financial system capability may be impacted significantly. 48 Hence, it is in Indonesia’s long-term interest to resolve the crisis brewing in the Gulf. However, it is worthy to note that the GCC countries, particularly the more dominant Saudi Arabia and UAE, are unlikely to accept a neutral third-party, as they expect any outsiders to either be “for” or “against” them. With such considerations in mind, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIP”) argues that Indonesia should act as a peace facilitator instead of a mediator. According to LIPI researcher Nostalgiawan Wahyudhi, Indonesia, as a middle power, is not yet equipped with “adequate diplomatic pressure” toward the countries involved in the crisis. Hence, mediation will prove to be ineffective.49 With that being said, Indonesia can therefore play a role as a strategic peace facilitator—not mediator—in the diplomatic spat due to its neutrality, economic interest, and amicable relations with all GCC countries. 


Nearly three years on, and the crisis seems to be stuck in an impasse. In 2018, Saudi Arabia revealed its plan to dig a canal along the Saudi-Qatar border—Qatar’s sole land border—thereby turning Qatar into an island.50 A year later, in 2019, the regional tension was made further apparent in the AFC Asian Cup 2019 when UAE fans pelted Qatar team with shoes and drowned out Qatar’s national anthem with boos when the latter won against the former by 4-0, highlighting the worsening public views on Qatar by citizens of the blockading countries.51 In January 2020, Qatar revealed that talks to resolve the crisis, which began in October the previous year, were unsuccessful and eventually suspended.52 Moreover, this diplomatic crisis has threatened the khaleeji identity that is anchored upon the Gulf region’s cultural homogeneity.53 Worse, the 2017 crisis has devolved into the region’s most significant diplomatic imbroglio over the course of GCC’s history, thereby tearing the social fabric within the Gulf states that is difficult to mend. The aftermath will be sour. However, it is unlikely that Qatar will make a full-on compromise. The opposite whereby the Quartet eases their grip on Qatar is also unlikely. Efforts exerted so far have not been successful in ending—or at least alleviating—the diplomatic row, as tensions remain high among the gulf countries. The blockading countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, is adamant in sustaining the blockade against Qatar, despite it being somewhat counterproductive to Saudi’s strategic calculations as the ongoing dispute seems to leave Qatar with very little choice but to seek new alignments, namely Iran and Turkey. In any case, it is worthy to note that the nature of decision-making within the GCC countries is highly personalized, driven by personal views and preferences with little regard to or input from formal institutions, international organizations, or the public,54 thus making the rapprochement between Qatar and the Quartet more difficult. Based on the previous considerations, it is likely that the crisis will remain in a state of stalemate before a resolution is achieved. 

When choosing, let alone leaving the neighborhood, is not an option, Qatar has to grapple with the dilemma of having to abide by the rules set by its neighbors at the expense of its independence, or continue living on its own accord but subjected to a host of difficulties from its mighty neighbors. It is certainly not a straightforward choice to make. Yet, Qatar has to ultimately choose between their “devil” and the deep blue sea.


1 Qatar says list of demands by Arab states not realistic (2017, June 24). BBC News. Retrieved from

2 Ulrichsen, Kristian C, “Lessons and Legacies of the Blockade of Qatar,” Insight Turkey 20 no.2 (2018): 11-20,

3 Cafiero, Giorgio, “The “Trump Factor” in the Gulf Divide,” in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 139.

4 Qatar diplomatic crisis – what you need to know (2017, June 5). The Guardian. Retrieved from

5 Ibid.

6 Kinnimont, Jane, The Gulf Divided: The Impact of the Qatar Crisis, (London: Chatham House, 2019), 10.

7 Baabood, Abdullah, “The Future of the GCC Amid the Gulf Divide,”, in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 167.

8 Roberts, David. (2020, January 28). Qatar row: What’s caused the fall-out between Gulf neighbors?. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

9 Iran: Rouhani welcomes developing relations with Qatar (2019, June 6). Aljazeera. Retrieved from 190605154738749.html.

10 Boussois, Sébastien, “Iran and Qatar: A Forced Rapprochement,” in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 218.

11 Boussois, “Iran and Qatar,” 223.

12 Boussois, “Iran and Qatar,” 224.

13 Ibid.

14 Boussois, “Iran and Qatar,” 227.

15 Toumi, Habib. (2014, December 27). GCC endured its worst diplomatic crisis in 2014. Gulf News. Retrieved from 1.1432568.

16 Khatib, Lina, “Qatar’s foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 89, no. 2 (March 2013): 417-431,

17 Ulrichsen, Kristian C, “Lessons and Legacies of the Blockade of Qatar,” Insight Turkey 20 no.2 (2018): 11-20,

18 Sharp-Polos, Brennen. (2019, December 19). Blockade on US Interests: Why Washington Must End the Gulf Crisis. The Globe Post. Retrieved from interests/.

19 Robbins, James. (2017, June 9). Qatar crisis: The deep diplomatic tensions behind the row

20 Stephens, Michael. (2017, June 7). Why key arab countries have cut ties with Qatar – and what Trump had to do with it. The Washington Post. Retrieved from cage/wp/2017/06/07/what-you-should-know-about-qatar-now/.

21 Amidror, Yaakov, “The Qatar Crisis: Signs of Weakness,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper no. 497 (June 2017): 2.

22 Former adviser to Trump: Riyadh summit triggered siege on Qatar (2017, October 25). Middle East Monitor. Retrieved from summit-triggered-siege-on-qatar/.

23 Cafiero, Giorgio, “The “Trump Factor” in the Gulf Divide,” in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 137.

24 Ibid.

25 Habibi, Nader. (2019, June 17). Qatar’s Blockade Enters Third Year: Who Are the Winners and Losers?. The Globe Post. Retrieved from

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Qatar’s support for Turkey’s military operation in Northeast Syria reflects the two countries’ close alliance, expresses defiance of the Arab League (2019, October 23). MEMRI. Retrieved from close.

29 Szalai, Máté. (2018, September 14). The crisis of the GCC and the role of the European Union. MENARA. Retrieved from

30 Kumar, Sachin. (2019, March 5). Qatar, Russia pledge to boost relations. The Peninsula. Retrieved from,-Russia-pledge-to-boost-relations.

31 Issaev, Leonid. (2017, June 13). Russia and the GCC crisis. Aljazeera. Retrieved from

32 Szalai, Máté. (2018, September 14). The crisis of the GCC and the role of the European Union. MENARA. Retrieved from

33 Qatar Airways annual loss widens to $639 million amid lingering Gulf dispute (2019, September 18). Reuters. Retrieved from widens-to-639-million-amid-lingering-gulf-dispute-idUSKBN1W31MK.

34 Qatar’s wealth fund brings $20bn home to ease impact of embargo (2017, October 18). Financial Times. Retrieved from

35 Sharp-Polos, Brennen. (2019, December 19). Blockade on US Interests: Why Washington Must End the Gulf Crisis. The Globe Post. Retrieved from interests/.

36 Zayadin, Hiba. (2019, June 4). Qatar Isolation Two Years On. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from

37 Karolak, Magdalena. (2019, May 19). Gulf Countries: The Struggle for a Common Identity in a Divided GCC. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. Retrieved from

38 Carmody, Liam. (2018, July 18). Qatar one year on: crisis and re-emergence. Future Directions International. Retrieved from emergence/.

39 Martin, Justin D. (2019, February 12). The blockade of Qatar has made Qataris more supportive of free speech. The Washington Post. Retrieved from cage/wp/2019/02/11/why-are-qataris-now-more-supportive-of-free-speech/.

40 Kinnimont, Jane, The Gulf Divided: The Impact of the Qatar Crisis, (London: Chatham House, 2019): 32.

41 Bakir, Ali, “The Evolution of Turkey—Qatar Relations Amid a Growing Gulf Divide,” in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 210.

42 Sly, Liz. (2018, May 14). Princely feuds in the Persian Gulf thwart Trump’s efforts to resolve the Qatar dispute. The Washington Post. Retrieved from the-persian-gulf-thwart-trumps-efforts-to-resolve-the-qatar-dispute/2018/05/13/7853cc88-39cf-11e8-af3c- 2123715f78df_story.html.

43 Al-Muftah, Hamad, “Qatar’s Response to the Crisis: Public Diplomacy as a Means of Crisis Management,” in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 234.

44 Ibid, 250.

45 Michaella, Sonya. (2017, June 6). Indonesia urges dialogue amid Qatar diplomatic crisis. Retrieved from diplomatic-crisis.

46 Shihab, M. Abdul (2019, June 18). Indonesia should seek more economic cooperation with Gulf States. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from should-seek-more-economic-cooperation-with-gulf-states.html.

47 Sheany (2017, June 19). Indonesia should remain neutral, act as a peace facilitator in Qatar-Gulf crisis: LIPI. Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from facilitator-qatar-gulf-crisis-lipi/.

48 Muhajir, M. Harris. (2017, June 22). How embargo affects Qatar investment in Indonesia. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from investment-in-indonesia.html.

49 Sheany. (2017, June 19). Indonesia should remain neutral, act as a peace facilitator in Qatar-Gulf crisis: LIPI. Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from facilitator-qatar-gulf-crisis-lipi/.

50 Bostock, Bill. (2019, August 1). Here’s how the locked-down Saudi Arabia-Qatar border became one of the tensest places on earth, sparking outrageous plans to build a 37-mile-long canal and turn Qatar into an island. Business Insider. Retrieved from serious-2019-7?r=US&IR=T.

51 Asian Cup: Qatar pelted with shoes by hostile UAE fans as they thrash hosts 4-0 to reach final (2019, January 30). Agence France-Presse. Retrieved from M. Harris. (2017, June 22). How embargo affects Qatar investment in Indonesia. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from thrashed-4-0.

52 Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January (2020, February 16). Aljazeera. Retrieved from 200215163349731.html.

53 Abdulla, Gaith (2016). Khaleeji identity in contemporary Gulf Politics. Retrieved from

54 Baabood, Abdullah, “The Future of the GCC Amid the Gulf Divide,” in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Andreas Krieg (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2019), 168.

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